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Abstract
In this paper the collapse of a bilateral fixed exchange-rate regime is
described as the optimizing decision of the two countries' monetary au-
thorities on when to break down the cooperative exchange-rate agree-
ment. In particular, the two countries experience a trade-off between
(a) fixing the nominal exchange rate, and therefore losing monetary
independence, but having exogenous benefits from the agreement, and
(b) letting the nominal exchange rate freely fluctuate so as to isolate
the countries from asymmetric shocks on nominal variables. The paper
derives the optimal exit decision in a stochastic framework when there
are exogenous and irreversible benefits from the fixed exchange-rate
regime. As a result, the agreement tends to last longer than it would
in a deterministic framework even though big asymmetric shocks hit
the two countries. This could well describe why the exchange-rate
arrangement among the European countries (i.e., the Exchange Rate
Mechanism of the European Monetary System) lasted so long with no
realignments after 1987. In particular, the crisis occurred a few years
after both German Monetary Unification and the burst of the last Eu-
ropean recession.
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The monetary history of Europe in the last two decades has been character-
ized by a succession of different exchange-rate regimes and it has been the
object of many recent academic contributions.
Following its establishment in 1979, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
of the European Monetary System (EMS) was mainly an adjustable-peg
with frequent realignments in the first eight years. With the Basle-Nyborg
Agreement (1987) the system became a tightly fixed exchange-rate regime
(see Giavazzi and Spaventa, 1990). In particular, the Agreement discour-
aged realignments and promoted intra- and infra-marginal interventions by
lowering the cost of borrowing among central banks.
3 In other words, it was
believed that enhancing cooperation among the central banks would avoid
the occurrence of future currency crises.
And this actually worked for over five years. Suddenly, in the fall 1992
the English Pound and the Italian Lira abandoned the system due to the
occurrence of huge speculative attacks. A few months later other curren-
cies also (including the "healthy" French Franc) were under attack, but the
system managed to survive. Finally, in the summer 1993 most currencies
'I wish to thank Matthew D. Shapiro for the numerous and valuable discussions on
the model and for his comments on previous versions of this work. In addition Alan
Deardorff, Phil llowrey, Cecilia Jona-Lasinio, John Laitner, Stefan Oppers, Chris Proulx,
Alan Stockman, Ennio Stacchetti, provided me with very useful suggestions. All the
p'artecipants at the Research Seminar in International Economics and the Summer GES
Mectings (both at the University of Michigan) have given useful insights. This paper has
Also been presented at the Midwest Macroeconomics Conference, September 15-17, 1995,
hivid at Michigan State University, East Lansing MI. Usual disclaimers apply.
2'orrespondence: Dept. of Economics, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor MI,
.1$109 USA. e-mail: gdearcumich.edu, until Dec. 20, 1995. After Dec. 20, 1995: Di-
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moail:gdearruitcaspur.caspur.it
'See. in particular, the changes in the very short-term financial facilities as described,
for instance, in De Grauwe (1994a).
were again under attack and the national authorities decided not to realign,
but to widen their fluctuation bands from ±2.25% to ±15% around the de-
clared parities (with the exception of the Dutch Guilder that maintained
the original ±2.25% band).
This recent crisis has greatly revived the debate on speculative attacks,
balance-of-payments crisis and the long-run substainability of fixed exchange-
rate regimes with free capital mobility.
In particular, many authors interpreted all the major events that charac-
terized Europe between 1987 and 1992 - i.e., German Monetary Unification,
the Maastricht Treaty, the European recession that started in 1990-91 - in
the framework of traditional speculative-attack models.
More exactly, the literature has mainly compared two classes of models
hinged on the exhaustion of international reserves. The first one highlights
that a misalignment in the fundamentals between the leading country (which
has been identified as Germany in Europe) and the other countries leads to
speculative attacks as a run on international reserves. For instance, Krug-
man (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) interpret this misalignment as a
divergence in the monetary policies of the two countries.
The second class stresses the importance of self-fulfilling speculative at-
tacks. In this case speculators foresee a change in the monetary policy of
the weak-currency country as a consequence of the currency crisis. Fun-
damentals do not need to be divergent before the crisis. Instead, specula-
tors perceive that there is an incentive for the weak-currency authorities to
change monetary policy only after that they will not fix the exchange rate
anymore. As a consequence, the fundamentals diverge, the weak-currency
actually depreciate and the speculators can make huge capital gains in the
foreign exchange market (see Obstfeld, 1986).
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) have underlined the gradualism "with
no forgiveness" towards the European Monetary Union (EMU) of the Maas-
tricht Treaty (i.e., strict requirement of no realignments in the past two
years to enter the last phase of EMU, otherwise the country would be re-
jected from the EMU project) as the incentive for the national authorities
to switch policy regime once they had to abandon the fixed-exchange-rate
policy. According to Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993), this triggered a self-
fulfilling, Obstfeld (1986)-type of attack on most of the currencies especially
because the expected probability of a change in the policy regime was par-
ticularly high due to the deep European recession, at its peak in 1992-93.
However, some recent alternative models have underlined that the ex-
haustion of reserves is rarely the effective cause of the regime abandonment
(see, for instance, in Obstfeld, 1994, the evidence regarding the attack on
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I he Swedish Krona).
Instead, these recent contributions have stressed that collapses of fixed
exchange-rate regimes can be the outcome of optimizing decisions. In par-
ticular, Ozkan and Sutherland (1994a, b and c) have shown how the aban-
donment of the fixed exchange-rate regime for a small country may be the
optimizing decision of authorities whose welfare function is only based on
aggregate output (which they more generally qualify as a monetary index)
in a -keynesian" (fixed-price) world. When the conduct of monetary policy
in the foreign leading country is very tight and the foreign interest rate rises,
I he aut horities of the weak-currency country may find it optimal to leave
t he regime.
In this paper I propose the application of a similar optimizing approach,
but in a two-country model and with a general asymmetric shock. In par-
titular. the monetary authorities of both countries optimally decide to what
crtent to coordinate perfectly their monetary policies and successfully avoid
speculative attacks. After all, this is what the Basle-Nyborg Agreement
promoted.
In particular, differently from other models that have been applied to
the EI IRI crisis, I consider the fixed exchange-rate regime as a fully bilateral
regime where both countries receive benefits and pay some costs. The analy-
sis endogenously determines how the costs are shared and, as a result, gives
the trigger value of the driving asymmetric shock at which exchange-rate
pegging is optimally abandoned. by both countries.
During the years between 1990 and 1993 all the EMS countries were hit
by two big asymmetric shocks pointing in the same direction: the German
UInification, which greatly increased fiscal transfers and public expenditure
in Germany; and a deep recession in all the other EMS countries. The model
developed in this paper underlines the importance of such asymmetrics and
aims at pointing out the important factors that characterize the trigger
value of such a strong shock. When that trigger value is reached, the weak-
currency monetary authorities are no longer willing to restrict the money
supply and the strong-currency monetary authorities are no longer willing
to expand their money supply (for instance, by a supporting intervention in
favor of the weak currency).
In the present model the burden for each country imposed by asymmetric
shocks is endogenously determined. However, such a burden can be too high
and the flexible exchange-rate regime may be desirable to both countries in
order to reacquire the extra policy instrument needed to cope with the shock
-- i.e., the nominal exchange rate.
The decision-making problem of the monetary authorities has strong
similarities with the case of the firm that has to decide when to disinvest in
a certain market: there is a value in waiting to see if better times come, and
this may explain why disinvestment does not immediately occur (see Dixit,
1992). Similarly, there was a value in waiting for the monetary authorities
of both countries to see if the asymmmetric shock was reversing - i.e., if
either the recession would get milder or the fiscal policy in Germany less
expansionary. This may explain why the EMS crisis occurred so long after
the asymmetric shock started, but certainly when it was at its peak.
In the next section I present the optimizing decision of the monetary au-
thorities of the two countries in the case of perfect capital mobility. Section
3 contains an illustrative example that readers with knowledge of the op-
timal stopping-point problem may skip. Section 4 derives the crisis trigger
point and its determinants are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes
with some implications for the future of the transition towards EMU.
2 An Optimizing Model of Exchange-Rate Regime
Switching in a Two-Country World
Consider a two-country model with perfect capital mobility and perfect as-
set substitutability. Initially the two countries are in a fixed (nominal)
exchange-rate regime and country-1 monetary authorities' welfare is repre-
sented by the following function:
Wi(pi) = E [z - pi(r)2]e--(r-dr I pi(t) = Pi] (1)
In words, the country-1 monetary authorities want to maximize the ex-
pected discounted flow of net benefits with the discount rate 6. The authori-
ties have a strong preference for price stability. Actually, the quadratic term
in the flow represents deviations of the country-1 (log) price level, pi(r), from
a given price level normalized to one. Z instead represents an exogenous flow
of benefits from being in a fixed exchange-rate regime; once the authorities
decide to let the currency freely fluctuate, the flow Z is irreversibly lost for
all the future periods.'
Country-2 monetary authorities have a similar welfare function:
'The most typical example of such benefits is the set of economic agreements in other
areas (for instance, the Common Agricultural Policy) among the European countries,




IW 2(P2) = E [IZ - ap2 (r) 2 ]e-* t*dr P2(t) = P2] (2)
The only difference between the two countries' welfare is in the "price-
iistability aversion", which is represented by the parameter a. When a is
less (greater) than one, then the country-2 domestic authorities care less
(nore) about price stability than country-I authorities and this is repre-
sented by a lower (higher) impact on their welfare when there is departure
from price stability.
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The price levels that the two countries are willing to stabilize are deter-
nined in the following two-country model:
mi(r) - p,(r) = eyl(r) - i
1
(r)
yj(T) = -[s(r) - p1 (r) + P2(T) - -[i 1(r) - Gi(r)}2 2
+c1(r)
y1(r) = cgd





All the variables are in log terms (except for the interest rates). The two
countries are characterized by two distinct money markets for each currency
(Eq. (3a) and (4a)). Each foreign currency (i.e., country-2 currency in
country 1 and country-1 currency in country 2) is dominated by foreign
bonds, since foreign money does not give any money services.' There is
also a goods market in each country where the supply of goods is fixed (Eq.
(3c) and (4c)) and the demand for goods (Eq. (3b) and (4b)) depends on
the relative price of the two goods - i.e. the real exchange rate - and
the real interest rate. The nominal exchange rate s is measured in units of
country-1 currency per one unit of country-2 currency and Eq. (5) represents
uncovered interest parity. Finally, F, G1 and G 2 are indices of (respectively)
expected nominal exchange-rate depreciation, expected country-I inflation
and expected country-2 inflation.
The two economies are identical except for the different indices of ex-
pected inflation and the presence of two asymmetric shocks E, and £2. The
two country-specific shocks are the driving processes and are distributed as
driftless brownian motions respectively with standard deviations at and a2.
They can be combined in one "fundamental" asymmetric shock, e, whose
standard deviation depends on the standard deviations of the single shocks
and on their correlation, p1,2 (Eq. (6a)-(6c)).
The model is characterized by the classical dichotomy between the real
and the nominal side. Therefore, independently of the type of nominal
exchange-rate regime in place, the shocks ea and a2 affect the equilibrium
values of the relevant real variables - i.e., the real exchange rate and the
real interest rate.
In other words, a positive value in both shocks implies a relative increase
in the demand for the country-1 good with respect to the country-2 good.
As a consequence, the relative price of the country-1 good with respect to
the country-2 good must increase - i.e., there must be a real appreciation
of the country-1 currency.
By normalizing the aggregate supply of each good to one and solving for
the country-1 real exchange rate, I obtain at all times r:7
S(r) - pi(r)+P2(r)= tr) tr[F(T) - Gi(r) t G2(r)J -
_ __
S2q 97
tHowever, domestic agents need foreign currency to buy foreign bonds.
'Notice that the term in squared brackets is the expected change in the real exchange
rate. Since the driving process is an unregulated brownian motion, all the variables will
be functions of such a process and their expected change is zero. Therefore, the expected
real depreciation of the country-1 currency is zero.
A .
I1r2 (T) - p2(r) = Iy2(r) - -12(r)
y2(T) = - [s(r) -p1(r)±+p2(r) J- i2(r) - 0 2(r)J
-E2(r)
y.2(r) = y2
(152 = a2 dw






E(r) = c(r)+ 2(r) (6a)
de = adw (6b)
a = affa2+2p1 2ala2  (6c)
'The flow of benefits Z is assumed to be equal for both countries, but the analysis can
be extended to the case of different flows for each country.
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Let mc assume with no loss of generality that el > e2, so that e > 0.
Then, interest rates must rise and the demand for money in both countries
must fall. Then, given the welfare functions of the two countries' monetary
authorities, the available options for monetary policymaking depend on the
type of nominal exchange-rate regime.
Under flexible exchange rates restrictive monetary policies can be un-
dertaken in both countries and the real appreciation of country-1 currency
will fully become a nominal appreciation. Price stability in both countries
can be achieved via changes (and also high volatility) in the nominal ex-
change rate. However, by switching to the flexible exchange-rate regime the
authorities forgo all the exogenous benefits Z.
The countries start in a fixed exchange-rate regime and in this case the
monetary authorities of both countries have one instrument (i.e., monetary
policy) for two objectives (i.e., price stability and a fixed exchange rate).
In particular, given the necessary change in the real exchange rate, now
both authorities cannot implement restrictive monetary policies to save price
stability and have at the same time a fixed value for s. Once the pegged
value of the exchange rate is normalized to one, then the following must
hold:
e(r)
p2(r) - pt(r) = m2(r) - mi(r) = (-71
In other words, the price levels and, hence, the money stocks are inter-
dependent: the model simply determines what must happen to the relative
price level (and. hence, to the relative money stocks), but leaves indeter-
initiate the adjustment that must take place in each country. This is the
so-called redundancy or n-I problem that always arises in a fixed exchange-
rate regime-
8
Let me assume that the burden of the shock is split between the two
monetary authorities according to the fraction #:
P1 ()= 
e(r )
"(iavazzi and Giovannini (1989. chapter 4) have a similar two-country model, but with
a different driving process. They show that if the authorities have different objectives in
heir welfare functions (in particular, one has the money stock and the other international
reserves), then in the Pareto-optimal arrangement the country with international reserves
in its objective function will always take the whole burden of adjustment in the driving
process. However, empirical evidence seems to be weak on the idea that the European
countries (other than Germany) want to stabilize international reserves as their main
objective.
P2(r) = -(1- )
where 0 < Q < 1.
Hence, given the required adjustment in the real exchange rate, country-
1 authorities increase the money stock in order to let the country-1 price
level increase by 0*( and country-2 authorities decrease the money stock
so that the country-2 price level decreases by (1 - 3)'(' at every time r.
When the shock takes more and more positive values and price insta-
bility rises, the cost for staying in the fixed exchange-rate regime becomes
higher and higher. Then, there will be a particular value of e for which the
authorities decide to switch to a flexible exchange rate and to irreversibly
lose the benefits Z.
In other words, the decision when to end the regime can be derived as
the solution of an optimal stopping-point problem. Before formally showing
such a solution, in the next Section I present a discrete-time, discrete-space
example with a three-period horizon to give some general intuition of the
general problem. Readers that are familiar with the optimal stopping-point
problem in continuous time and a stochastic setup may skip next Section.
3 A Three-Period, Two-State, One-Country Ex-
ample
In this example let me neglect the interaction between the two countries by
assuming that # = 1. The currency regime is then a unilateral exchange-rate
regime where the burden of adjustment falls entirely on country 1 and its
survival is only a decision of country 1.
Let me also assume that time is discrete, that there are three periods
(0 to 2) and that the increments to the driving process e follow a discrete
random walk.
In particular, e can take discrete values and starting from state i at time
0, it can be i - 1 with probability p and i + 1 with probability q = 1 - p at
time 1. Therefore, at the final time 2, e can take value i -2 with probability
p2, i with probability 2pq and i + 2 with probability q2. In other words, the
increments of a follow a random walk and the cumulative change of e is a
binomial random variable with transitional probabilities p and q since the
increments are assumed to be independent. Figure 1 presents a diagram for
this case.
In each period, first there is a realization of the stochastic shock, then
7
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Figure 1: States of the Discrete Random Walk in the Three-Period Example
1=0
p q
t i- 1 +l-




the country decides whether to still keep the exchange rate fixed or to leave
the agreemnent.
Let me assume for simplicity that i = 1. Then the welfare function can
be written as follows if the country stays in the fixed exchange-rate regime
for all the three periods:
i=o[ +6
(Z -i 2 )+-- {plZ - (i - 1)2]+ q(Z - (i + 1)2]}+
(1)2
1 )b {p
2(Z -(i - 2)2]+2pq[Z -i
2 4 q2[Z -(i+ 2)21)
The expression above clearly shows that, given the the binomial distri-
bution of s, the value of the welfare function depends only on the initial
state of the shock (-o = i) and on the length of the horizon (T = 2), apart
from the exogenous Z, the given discount rate 6 and the probabilities p and
q. I will derive a generalization of this formula in the next Section.
Let me assume that p = q = 1/2; then, the welfare function becomes:
Wo(i;T=2) = (1 + R+ R
2
)Z -(1 + R+ R
2) 2 - R - 21R
where R = 1/(1 + 6) is the discount factor.
Hence, when the initial value of the shock is in the following range:
1+2R .1+2R1Z+R +R+R 2 < <+ Z-R+R+R2
then the welfare function when fixing the exchange rate for the remaining
two periods is positive and the option to leave the exchange-rate agreement
is not exercized at the end of time 0. Let me stress only the positive part of
this interval and define:
'2 Z - R 1+R R+RR
The above computation however does not take into account that at time
1, after the realization of the shock, the country can leave the agreement.
This opportunity of letting the currency float after one period increases the
overall value of the welfare function.
For instance, when sitting at time 0 and by assuming that at time 1 the
exit option is exercized, the welfare function takes the following value:
LVo,(i;T=2) = (Z-i
2
)+( 1  ) Z-(i -1) 2 ]+ Z-(i+ 1)2
= (1+R)Z-(1+R)i 2 -R
Let me consider only positive realizations of the shocks. Then, the
threshold value of i up to which it befits to stay in the agreement is:
R
50,1 = rZ R+-
which is always higher than the previous threshold io,2.
The two welfare functions, Wo., and Wo,2 , are shown in Figure 2 when
the exogenous benefits Z is sufficiently high. When i < i* the welfare for
staying until period 2 is higher than the welfare from exiting at period 1.9
On the contrary, when i> i* then Wo,1 > Wo,2.
'The value of i* is v/Z-
9
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Since exiting before period 2 is optional, the welfare function at period
0 is t hen given by:
Wo = max [Wo,i; Wo, 21
which is represented by the thick line in Figure 2.
Moreover, t he initial realization of the shock e determines the expected
exit time. When E takes on a low value - i.e., i < i* - , then Wo,2 holds
and t he expected ending time of the regime is period 2. Instead, if i > i*,
t hen Wo .t holds and the expected exit time is period 1.
'The expected exit time strongly depends on the value of the exogenous
benefit Z. When Z is low,' 0 Wo,, is always higher than Wo, 2 and the ex-
pected exit time is always period 1 regardless of the initial realization of
This has an intuitive explanation: when the exogenous benefits to stay
in the regime are low, then there is an incentive to bear only low adverse
shocks for an expected shorter period of time.
Next. at period 1 after the realization of the shock, the option to leave
can he exercized or not depending on the initial realization of the shock.
in case at period i E rises to i + 1, then the welfare function becomes:
W,;+t(i: T= i1) = (Z - i2)+ R[Z -(i+ 1)2] + R2{[Z - i2]+ [Z - (i +2)2]}
This expression is greater than 0 when:
i+ _VZ- R(1+2R) + (R(1+R 1J2<
~(1 +R ) R+R ) (+RR
R(I+R R(1+2R (R(I+R 12
(1+R+R ) + ~(-+R+R ) +(+R+R )
It can be shown that the upper bound of this interval is lower than the
tupper bound of the interval obtained when considering the welfare function
with no option to leave at time 1 - i.e., io,2. Let me define such an upper
bound i+
- R(1+R) R(1+2R) [R(1+R) 2
- (1l+R+R 2) + Z- (1+R+R2)+ (1+R+R2)
"'More exactly when Z < 2/R.
Instead, in case at period 1 the shock takes value i - 1, the welfare
function is:
W- i(i; T = 1) = (Z - i2 )+ R[Z - (i- 1)2]+iR2{[Z -(i -2)2]+ [Z - i2]
And the interval in which welfare is positive is the following:
R 1+R _ R1+2R) + [ +R 2
R +R, + Z - R 1+2R + ( +R
(t++) V (+R+R 3) 1+iT+ J
Let me define the upper bound of this interval as ijj:
-1 = R(1+R) + Z -R(1+2R) [ R(1+R) 
2
'1 ~(1+R+R 2 ) (1+R+R 2) t(1+R+ R2)j
In this case, depending on the value of Z and the discount rate 6 such
an interval can either comprehend both i0 ,1 and io,2 or not.
Let me first notice that for high values of Z the upper bound ij of
the interval is always higher than i0,1. However, the country never gets to
period 1 if e does not take an initial value that is lower than io,,. Therefore,
sitting at period 1, any value of i exceeding i0,1 can be disregarded.
Instead, when Z takes a low value
1 the highest threshold iij at period
I is lower than i0,1.
Hence, the highest threshold at period 1 to exercize the exit option is:
i1,1 = max [ij; i+j]
I have already shown that iii is lower than io,1; moreover, ij is always
lower than io,1 when Z is not too high.
In general, i1,1 must not be higher than io,1 because only when the
realization of the shock at period 0 is lower than i0,1 the authorities do not
exercize the exit option already at the end of period 0. In addition, for low
values of Z the threshold for which the option is exercized at time 1, i.e.
i1,, is always lower than the threshold at time 0, i.e. io,1. Therefore, I can
conclude that i1,1 is never higher than i0,1 and is strictly lower when Z is
not too high as it is shown in Figure 3.
"But still high enough to assure a positive radicand.
11
12
In t he end. t his simple example highlights a few important points.
-irst. as already mentioned above, the opportunity of opting out of the
agreement increases the welfare function. This is shown in Figure 2 where
the final welfare function becomes a sort of envelope of the two welfare
functions Wo., and Wo.2-
Second, given the finite horizon, the remaining time for the option to be
exercized is particularly relevant to determine the threshold values of the-hock for which the fixed exchange-rate system survives from one period to
the next. In general, these thresholds are lower and lower as the remaining-
time decreases: i. 1* cannot be higher than io,j, as explained above, and it is
surely lower when Z is not very high (see Figure 3).
Intuitively, this happens because the remaining time to exercize the op-
tion goes to zero as time goes by and we are approaching the final period.
Hence, since the welfare is increased by the opportunity of exiting, the wel-
fare function is then raised by less and less as there are fewer and fewer
periods in which the option can be exercized.
12 In terms of Figure 2 as we
are approaching the final period there are fewer and fewer welfare functions
of which to take the envelope. The example shows that the "degree of toler-
ance" towards adverse shocks lowers the value of the exit point as time goes
lay.
Moreover, the time when the option is exercized is a random variable
and depends on both the initial realization of the shock and the remaining
tine. In particular, in the example above it is possible to obtain the collapse
time of the regime in some particular cases. For instance, if it,t < io,1 and
the initial realization of a is ii, 1 < io < io,1, then the exchange rate regime
ends in period 1. In fact, at period 0 e is low enough that country 1 decides
to, stay one more period. However, since the initial realization io is higher
t hali the t hreshold i1 , 1 , the country leaves the regime at the end of period
1. In other words, given the particular values of the parameters such that
ii., < i.,u and the initial realization io, even if e goes down bewteen period
I) and t its new value will not be low enough to assure a positive welfare
for the case of staying one period - i.e., both Wi+' and Wj are less than
zero.
linally, it ought to be noticed that the finite-horizon case becomes par-
ticularly complex because of the presence of two state variables - i.e., re-
maining time to exercize the option and the initial state i.
"See )ixit (1993, p. 49-51) for a generalization.
4 The Optimal Switching States and the Cooper-
ative Burden Shares
The example above has provided some intuition on the problem introduced
in Sect. 2. However, it has neglected the interactive nature of the model be-
tween the two countries. Moreover, given the short-run horizon, the ending
point of the regime could be obtained simply by considering all the possible
states of the world at all time periods.
Let me now consider the general problem by initially reporting the wel-
fare of the two countries for a generic burden share /3 and a generic ending
point e:
Wi(e;f, I) = E Z - /3 25(x) e(Tlldr | e(t) = e
W2(e;#,e) = E Z - (1 - #) 2 e()] e--(T-tdr | e(t) = e
where T(-) is the random switching time to flexible exchange rates, which
depends on the value of the switching state, E. I recall also that the shock
e(r) starts with value e at time t and follows a driftless brownian motion.
After time T(f) both countries are in flexible exchange rates. Then,
they no longer have the flow Z, but their monetary policies can be set
independently and price stability can be always maintained. Hence, both
welfare functions will be zero from time T(e) onwards.
The object of the analysis is to find the burden share and the value
of the switching state(s) that will satisfy both criteria of cooperation and
optimality for the two countries.
In particular, the outcome of the analysis should provide first a relation-
ship between the current state and the burden share. This function should
give the burden share which the two countries agree upon at different real-
izations of the shock.
Second, given the burden share at each state, the exit trigger point is
decided so that it satisfies two conditions. First, at the switching state the
two countries should be completely indifferent between fixing the nominal
exchange rate and floating (value-matching condition). Second, among all
the possible switching states that satisfy the value-matching condition, the
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two countries will choose the first one that optimizes a certain cooperative
criterion (smsooth-pasting or optimality condition).
In particular. I consider two types of cooperation. First, I assume that
welfare transfers are possible. Next, I consider a general Nash-bargaining
setup where no welfare transfers are present.
4.1 The Cooperative Setup with Welfare Transfers
In this section I assume that welfare transfers are possible between the two
countries. An eficient solution can then be obtained in terms of the burden
share and the exit trigger point.
Operationally. given the welfare possibility frontier that all the possible
burden splits can generate, the availability of utility transfers allows to select
a particular point on that possibility frontier so that the sum of the welfare is
maximized. The value of 0 that corresponds to that point on the possibility
frontier is the efficient share.
Such an efficient share could be directly obtained by maximizing (over
the choice variable 3) the sum of the welfare.
In addition, a common trigger-exit point is selected by the two countries.
At any exit trigger state the two countries must be indifferent between fixing
the nominal exchange rate and letting it float. In a cooperative setup with
t ransfers this means that, given the efficient redistribution of the asymmetric
shock, transfers from the country with the positive welfare are just enough
to compensate the country that is losing. An additional increase in the
absolute value of the asymmetric shock would then make both countries
worse off with respect to the floating-rate regime.
Then, among all these possible trigger-exit states, the two countries will
select the one that will maximize the sum of their welfare.
Formally, the exit state and the burden share should be obtained as
solutions to the following problem:
(0*(e), ec)= arg max [W1(e;#,e)+ W2(e;#,e)J
s. t. [Wt (e;i, )+ W2 (e;I3, )1ee = 0
Hy substituting for the two welfare functions, the problem can be rewrit-
ten as follows:
= argrmax E [T(Z{[ (_#(T)) +
Z - al - /3)2 (!1) 2] }e-6(t)dr | e(t)= e
s. t. E Z - e(r)) +
Z - a(1 - /)2 -(i)21 }e-6(7t)dr | e(t) = e = 0
Let me define V(e) as the value function for this problem. It depends
only on one state variable - i.e., the initial state e. This occurs because
although the expected integral to be maximized does not have an infinite
horizon, the stopping time is a function of the optimal stopping state. But
the optimal stopping state is a variable internally determined by the maxi-
mization problem. Therefore, "remaining time to exercize the option"" does
not represent an extra dimension of the problem since it is continuously and
internally determined by the optimization problem.
Hence, the value function V(e) can be defined as follows:
f(e)
V() = max E [? ;fe;/3)e-t-Od I E(t)= e
s. t. V(e) = 0
where
f(e;) [Z - ) + Z - o(1 - )2(
Since the value function is obtained as the max value function over two
variables, Q and e, let me fix momentarily F at e£ and solve for the optimal
d', which should then be a function of e and of the initially fixed e*.
3
This the additional state variable to include in these kinds of optimization problems.
See for instance Dixit (1993), p. 49-51.
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When fixing , to so the problem becomes a finite-horizon one since the
eiding time is now fixed by Ea. Therefore, the value function now depends
also on tinme and must satisfy the following (Bellman) partial differential
41quation:




flence, the function 3,;(e) can be easily obtained as:
(E)= argmaxf(e;#)
It turns out then that #;(s) does not depend on a*. Therefore, the bur-
den share is stable over different states of the world and does not depend on
the vicinity to the collapsing state. In other words, 3;(a) is state-consistent
to use the terminology of Ozkan and Sutherland (1994a, b and c).
Moreover, the choice of the burden share in this intertemporal frame-
work is not different from the single period case. In fact, ,3:(e) is simply
deternined as the share that maximizes the flow of benefits at each time.
This is a particular feature of the solution that depends mainly on the com-
plete exogeneity of the driving process and the absence of any feedback from
the burden share to the process E.
As a result, the best policy for the two countries when deciding cooper-
atively the burden share is to choose a law for #3 that maximizes the joint
welfare at each point in time.
By substituting back the definition for f(e;#13), the result is even stronger
inl Ihis case:
1 + a
The efficient share is constant over states in this cooperative setup and
it depends only on the relative "inflation aversion" of the two countries: the
lower the inflation aversion of country 2, then the lower the burden share of
t he more "inflation-averse" country 1.
Once the efficient burden share is determined, let me now obtain the
-efficient flow" by substituting it back in the original flow function:
a ,2
fe(E)=.-f(E;/ )=2Z -
Given the solution for the burden share, now I have to solve for the
optimal exit point. In particular, once the solution for the solution for the
burden share is substituted back in the value function, I now have:
I'(e)
V(e) = max E [If(e)e-a tdr I e(t) = e
t
s. t. V(i) = 0
Since the optimal exit point is endogenously determined, then also the
stopping time is endogenous. Hence, the value function is now a function
only of one state variable as originally stated above.
In particular, when F is below an exit point, then the value function must
satisfy the following Bellman equation for any (current) state e:
V(e) = (1 - odt)E[V(e + de)]+ fJ(e)dt (7)
with the boundary condition that V(C) = 0 for a generic exit point E.
In the Appendix A it is shown how the differential equation (7) is equiv-
alent to the following ordinary differential equation by using Ito's lemma:
6V(e) = -V"(e)+ fc(e)
In addition, one boundary condition holds at 9 as an exit point. This
means that when the asymmetric shock takes value i, the two countries are
indifferent between the fixed and the floating regime, as explained above:
V(e) =0
A second boundary condition states instead that cumulative negative
shocks are neglected for simplicity.
4
"In fact, under a quadratic welfare function I should assume that a persistent negative
shock could cause an undesirable high deflation domestically. Here, I rule out the exit
for such a case (or alternatively I assume that the lower exit point tends to -oo) for
two main reasons. First, if country 1 is Germany and e wants to represent the German
Unification shock and the recession in Europe, then economically I am interested in the
effect of the positive realizations of such a random variable, although the variable could
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hlence. I can now obtain the value function for a generic exit point
as the solution of the above differential equation with the two boundary
acnditions just discussed. This is a function of both the current state and
the generic exit point, and actually represents the joint welfare of the two
countries for any current state e below the exit point E:15
_ la 2Z ++ a: 2 ) eeC-E) +
l ) -(1+ a)6 92 T (1+xa)11282
fixed exchange-rate regime with large asymmetric shocks can be maintained
unless there are sufficiently high benefits accruing to both countries.
By ruling out low values of Z, the optimal switching point is the follow-
ing:
E' -+ 27 Z--2
26 a 26
(10)
2Z a 2  a 2
6 (1+a)1262 (1+a)6z12 (8)
where 6 = .Finally, optimization must take place: the authorities choose optimally
the switching point by selecting the value for that maximizes (8).
The optimality condition for F is given by the first-order condition in the
maximization of (8) provided that the function is concave. This first order
condition represents the smooth-pasting condition for this problem. In other
words, the first order condition selects the optimal stopping point at which
action takes place and the monetary authorities break the exchange-rate
agreement.
In the firm problem of Dixit (1992) the smooth-pasting condition selects
the optimal trigger point for which the value of the investment (or disin-
vestment) option is maximized. Here the smooth-pasting condition gives
the optimality condition to be satisfied by the optimal switching state in
order to maximize the welfare function of the authorities.
By differentiating with respect to i smooth-pasting requires:
A discussion on the main determinants of this exit point in provided in
Sect. 5.
In the next Section, I will present the solution to the bargaining problem
according to the axiomatic bargaining approach.
4.2 The Nash Bargaining Solution
The Nash bargaining approach proposes a solution to the bargaining prob-
lem that satisfies four axioms: invariance to equivalent welfare represen-
tations, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto effi-
ciency.
Such a solution can be obtained in the present case by maximizing the
product of the welfare functions over the burden share 13 and the exit point
(#3;(e),ec) = argmax [Wi(e;#,f)W2(e;#,E)J
s. t. [Wi(e;#A,) )+ W2 (e;3,)],=, = 0
Let me consider again the value function for this problem:
V(E) = nmax E fe;) ~dr|e)=
t
s. t. V(e) = 0
where
f(e;3) = Z - ()2]Z - a(1 - )2 (6)2]
The form of the problem is similar to the case of cooperation with welfare
transfers.
2 - 112 9 2Z- a =0 (9)
It ought to be noticed that if Z is sufficiently high the welfare function
is never always decreasing with respect to the switching point . In other
words, if the common benefits to the authorities are too low, then no optimal
switching point can be found since the authorities can always increase their
welfare by lowering the switching point. This is the same as to say that no
take also negative values. Second, even when including a lower exit point the qualitative
results of the analysis would not change substantially. However, the presence of a lower
exit point makes the algebra much more complex and the economic meaning of the results
more difficult to analyze.
"See Appendix A.
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In particular, since the function f(.; -) still depends only on the same
two variables as in the previous case, the determination of the burden share
will follow the same steps as above.
As a result. the burden share 13(e) results again from the pointwise deci-
sion of the two countries and it coincides with the Nash-bargaining solution
for the period-by-period case:
= argmaxf(E;3) = argmax z - ( Z - a(1 - 0)2
'Iherefore, quite surprisingly the intertemporal dimension does not play
any role in determining the law for #. This is due to the various charac-
teristics of the setup. First, the Markovian characteristic of the brownian
notion gives an initial time separability to the problem. In addition, the
time independence of the welfare flows and the absence of feedback from the
current -control variable" 13 on the driving process isolates the max operator
on the welfare flow.
Once the share d;(e) is determined, it can be substituted in the welfare
flow of each country in order to obtain the welfare flow for each country as
a function only of the current state.
Let moe define:
f?(E) - f (E; ((e))
for i = 1,2, where
f,(c;13) = [Z ( )2]
f2(e;#3) = [Z-a(1 - )2()
2]
'Then, I can obtain the welfare functions for each country given a generic
common exit state e. Analogously to the Sect. 4.1, the welfare function of
country i must satisfy the following differential equation when the current
state is below the exit state t:
2
6W,(e) = 2W ,'(e)+ f;(e)
The relative general solution is the following:
Wi(E) = Ae-e* + Bee* + W(e)
A and B are the constants of integration to be determined by the bound-
ary conditions and W(e) is the particular solution to the fundamental dif-
ferential equation, which depends on the shape of the function f,(e).
The boundary conditions Vi(e) = 0 and the irrelevance of negative real-
izations of the asymmetric shock'
6 can be considered as in Sect. 4.1.
Then, the solution takes the following shape for a generic exit point st:
Wi(e; ) = -Wi(e)eG('~e) + Wde)
Finally, the Nash-bargaining exit point can be obtained as the exit point
s; that maximizes the product of the two welfare functions just obtained:
En = arg max W,(e; f)W 2 (E; f)
By substituting from the welfare functions above, the first-order condi-
tion for the above problem has the following form:
[Wi(e)W 2(f) + Wi(E)W(e) - 26W1( )W2(E)]e6(e-e)-
[WIi)W 2(e) + W,(e)W (t)J + G(11(F)W2 (E) + 1(e)W 2(E)I = 0
Differently from the cooperative case with welfare transfers now state
inconsitency is present since the exit trigger point varies with the differ-
ent realizations of the shock. Hence, the first-order condition determines a
relationship between the current state and the exit trigger point:
=g(E)
The Nash state-consistent exit point is then the first fixed point of the
above condition.
5 The Determinants of the Optimal Trigger Points
and the 1992-93 ERM Crisis
Eq. (10) shows the trigger value of the asymmetric shock e for which it
is no longer optimal for both authorities to fix the nominal exchange rate





Slie relevant characteristics of this trigger point and I relate them to the
Eltl crisis in 1992-93 by assuming that the EMS was fully cooperative
exchange-rate regime with welfare transfers.
In undertaking the decision to break the agreement and not to defend
t he declared parities the analysis endogenously takes into consideration that
beth countries (and not only the weak-currency one) are forgoing the benefits
from an area of exchange-rate stability. In Europe higher exchange-rate
volatility means, for instance, to put pressure on the Community Budget
due to the compensatory transfers that would come from the asymmetric
design of the (ommmon Agricultural Policy.
The value of the trigger point e; depends on some key parameters. It is
tien interesting to study the effect of each one of them on the value of the
trigger point and. therefore, on the survival probability of the fixed exchange
rate between two countries.17
By assuming that e is the total asymmetric shock due to the German
Unification (et) and the recession in Europe (t2), then country 1 is the
center country (i.e. Germany) and country 2 each one of all the other EMS
members. Then, the model is able to point out some features in the bilateral
relationship between Germany and all the other EMS countries that could
explain why some countries abandoned the regime as early as September
1992 (i.e., Italy and UK) and some others surrended to market speculation
by changing the "rules of the game" almost a year later.'8
Let tie consider first the influence of the parameter 17. The relationship
with the exit trigger point is strongly positive. Intuitively, the higher the
aggregate demand elasticity to the real exchange rate, the lower the needed
adjustment in the real exchange rate (and, hence, in each domestic price
level under fixed exchange rates) when an asymmetric aggregate demand
shock occurs.
in other words, the parameter r measures a sort of degree of substi-
tutability between the goods produced in the two countries. In the extreme
case of perfectly substitutable goods (i.e., r tends to infinity), purchasing
power parity holds and the aggregate demand shock has only an effect on
the real interest rate, but no effect on the real exchange rate. In this case
the two countries do not lose any instrument (i.e., the nominal exchange
"The simulations are performed by using the following basic values: a=0.1, 6=0.01,
,t=1, Z=2n=0.95.
'The Spanish Peseta, the Portuguese Escudo and the Irish Punt managed to remain
in the ERM, but with (sometimes multiple) realignments. In the present analysis a re-
alignment can be considered an exit with immediate re-entry that reduces the exogenous
benefits Z. Therefore, the realignment case will not be so different from the exit case.
rate) in a fixed exchange-rate arrangement, but gain the benefits Z in the
current model.
An indicative measure of the relative interdependence between the Euro-
pean economies and their relative degree of openness can be obtained from
the IMF Multilateral Exchange Rate Model.19 By considering the impact
of the changes in the relative prices of output among the main European
economies, it is possible to obtain the weight of each relevant bilateral ex-
change rate when constructing the effective exchange rate of each economy.
For instance, the weight of the Deutsche Mark in the effective French Franc
is 0.236, whereas the weight of the French Franc in the effective, Deutsche
Mark is 0.201. By taking the simple averages of these bilateral weights as
a rough reference, the 0.218 between France and Germany is almost double
the value between Germany and UK (0.114).
Then, given the influence of the parameter p, the explanation of the
earlier -'exit" of UK with respect to France can hinge on the different degree
of openness of the two economies with respect to Germany.
Next, I consider the relationship between the impatience rate of the
authorities and the exit trigger point. It ought to be noticed first that the
influence of the impatience rate on the trigger point is only present when
there is uncertainty in the model, i.e. when a is not zero. In fact, in
the deterministic case changing values for 6 do not show up in the burden
shares and the trigger point depends only on 7, Z and a. Therefore, the
intertemporal profile in the preferences of the monetary authorities plays a
role exclusively in the current stochastic framework.20
Fig. 4 presents the relationship between the impatience rate and the
trigger point. In particular, the graph shows that the more impatient the
authorities, the lower the trigger point. In other words, when there is a high
weight on the present negative values in the welfare functions, this can offset
the possibility that in the future the shock can revert and the welfare flow
could become positive again. In the extreme case of authorities that care
only for the current value of the welfare flow - i.e., 6 is extremely large -
the trigger point is close to the deterministic trigger point.
Actually, the graph highlights that the negative relationship between the
impatience rate and the trigger point is confined to low values of the discount
GiThe data are referred to the 1977 base year and are fully reported in Giavazzi and
Giovannini (1989, p. 56).201n the cooperative case (both with and without transfers, an asymmetry in the dis-
count rates would make the problem no longer time-autonomous. Then, the the efficient
fraction d becomes time dependent and the problem in stochastic dynamic programming
can be solved by finding the solution to a partial differential equation.
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rate. The trigger point becomes very steady for values of the impatience rate
that are greater than half the standard deviation of the total asymmetric
shock i.e., for a value of B higher than one - in the present framework.
Next, Fig. 5 shows the effect of uncertainty in the model as introduced
with the brownian motion process. The dashed horizontal line represents
the trigger point when there is zero variability in the stochastic process -
i.e., the deterministic case.
The picture shows that the introduction of a stochastic element raises the
value of the trigger point and the expected survival of the regime. In other
words. when the variability of the process is sufficiently low, the authorities
are more willing -to wait and see". If negative offsetting shocks took place,
t he process would revert to zero and the welfare would become positive
again. Therefore, the authorities do not have to forgo the benefits Z.
in terms of the original model the total variability a is given by the
sum of each country-specific shock and their relative correlation (see Eq.
(6c)). As Fig. 5 highlights, differences in a2 and in P1,2 (and therefore
in the total a) between the country couples with Germany would identify
different trigger points in the bilateral relationships and thus different exit
times. This may represent an additional explanation why the various ERM
countries experienced the exchange-rate crisis at different times.
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Next, t lie role of the exogenous benefits Z and of the parameter a are
analyzed in Fig. 6. The higher the benefits Z, then of course the higher the
trigger point and the longer the fixed exchange-rate regime is expected to
last. However, also the lower the parameter a - i.e., the two countries have
a very different preference towards price stability - then the higher the
t rigger point. This occurs because the country with the lowest preference
towards price stability is available to take a higher share of the burden in the
price adjustment.
22 Therefore, Fig. 6 shows how the relationship between
! Itayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) have obtained a measure of country-specific
aggregate-demand and aggregate-supply shocks for the European countries, but only up
to 1988 and therefore excluding the critical years for the EMS. Their results show higher
correlations between the aggregate-supply shocks of Germany and the "core" countries
(France, Belgium and the Netherlands), whereas much lower correlations between Ger-
maniy and I1K or Italy are present. The correlations between aggregate-demand shocks
are less sharp and are all in the range 0.1-0.4.
An interesting update of this same study is presented by Whitt (1995) He includes
the years after 1988 till 1992 and not surprisingly some of the correlations obtained by
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1993) have changed. In particular, the correlation between
the aggregate demand shocks of Germany-France and Germany-UK are both significantly
negative (respectively -0.32 with a standard error of 0.11 and -0.34 with a standard error
of 0.11).
Hence, the exchange-rate arrangement is naturally asymmetric because of the different
the trigger point and the exogenous benefits Z changes for different values
of a. In particular, the picture highlights that such a relationship is quite
stable when a is sufficiently high.
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In conclusion, the analysis points out that a fixed exchange-rate regime
could collapse when a strong (composite) asymmetric shock occurs.
This confirms what the theory of optimum currency areas points out.
However, the analysis also stresses that when introducing a fully stochastic
shock, the crisis trigger point may be much higher than in the deterministic
case, as Fig. 5 shows.
In other words, a sort of hysteresis effect is present. In the stochastic
case the two countries' monetary authorities are willing to stay longer since
offsetting shocks may occur in the future and re-establish a fully positive
flow of benefits. Then, quitting the regime immediately when the benefit
flow becomes negative may result in the permanent (and irreversible) loss
of future benefits.
In the end, the analysis highlights couples of countries: (i) that are "less
open" (i.e., for which the elasticity of the aggregate demand to the real
exchange rate is lower), (ii) that experience composite asymmetric shocks
with either too low or too high variability, (iii) that have very impatient
authorities towards price stability and (iv) for which the exogenous benefits
from the existence of a stable exchange rate are low in comparison with their
willingness to absorb part of the asymmetric shock. Those are the couples
of countries to experience first the collapse in their bilateral exchange-rate
regime notwithstanding the cooperation between their monetary authorities.
attitudes towards inflation. When a is not zero, the system would be perfectly asymmetric
with an endogenous $ = 0 only if country 1 receives zero exogenous benefits Z from the
nominal exchange-rate stability. In that case the model would describe unilateral pegging.
Hence, the present model still saves asymmetries in the exchange-rate arrangement, but
a-priority excludes unilateral pegging.
"In the graph a takes values between 0.5 and 1. The relationship becomes less stable
only when a is very small. More exactly, the elasticity of Z with respect to a is 1 .
This means that when comparing the effect of the same (and sufficiently high) percentage
changes in Z and a on the trigger point value, the effect is much higher when of is very
small than when it is close to one. In particular, given the nonlinearity of the elasticity,
such an effect will be quite stable for values of a sufficiently close to one.
An indicative study on the subject is Alesina and Grilli (1992). The authors actually
compute indices of economic and political independence of the various national central
banks. Germany stands first with a value of 14; the Netherlands follows with 10 and all
the other ERM countries score between 5 and 7 (with the exception of Portugal with 3).
Notice that a statutory requirement of monetary stability is present only for the Danish
and the Dutch central banks besides the Bundesbank.
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6 Conclusions and Lessons for EMU
This paper describes the collapse of a bilateral (but not necessarily symmet-
ric). cooperative fixed exchange-rate regime.
In principle, such a fixed exchange-rate regime with the strong-currency
centr al bank always ready to support the other currencies under attack could
last forever, as pointed out in De Grauwe (1994a, p. 126-7).
llystory, however, shows that no declared bi- or multilateral exchange-
rate regime has lasted successfully through turbulent periods. This has
brought sonic scholars to question the real possibility of creating "true" bilat-
eral exchange-rate arrangements and to conclude that all fixed exchange-rate
regimes levelope into Stackleberg-structured games more than cooperative
games (see, for instance, Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989, Ch. 8).
Moreover.it has also been shown that such an international arrangement
where all the "wet" monetary authorities appoint the most "hard-nose" cen-
tral bank to (1o the monetary policymaking for the whole area, can be mainly
advantageous for the "wet" (periphery-follower) authorities. In other words,
the fixed exchange-rate regime can substitute for the appointment of the
Rlogoff (198.5) conservative central banker in the periphery countries. How-
ever, a fundamental difference is present: whereas the Rogoff conservative
central banker is fully accountable to the domestic overall authorities, the
center country is not. Then, since the central banker in the center coun-try cannot he fired, the periphery country shows its disapproval towards the
-appointed" center-country monetary authorities by exerting the exit option
and letting the domestic currency freely fluctuate.
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As a consequence of this approach, balance-of-payments crises have all
been described in a small-country framework as in Krugman (1979), Obstfeld
(1986) or lately Ozkan and Sutherland (1994a and b).
lowever, although the internal arrangement of any fixed exchange-rate
regime brings asymmetries among the members, it is not always necessary
to design any asymmetric exchange-rate regime as perfectly asymmetric in a
leader-follower(s) structure. Actually, in such a framework it is still puzzling
why one country would like to take the role of the leader. For instance,
Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989, Ch. 5) have shown that the center country
would be always better off in the flexible exchange-rate regime unless: (i) the
periphery country is particularly small and the center country is practically
indifferent about the currency pegging by the periphery country; or (ii) there
"See Eichengreen (1994), Ch. 6. The contribution by Oskan and Sutherland can be
considered a formalization of this concept.
are some sort of exogenous benefits that occur to the center country when
limiting the exchange-rate flexibility with the periphery country.
This paper starts from this latter point. In some declared bilateral
exchange-rate arrangements there may be exogenous benefits in limiting
the exchange-rate flexibility and this is what would qualify them as "bilat-
eral" versus "unilateral". Then, this does not mean that the exchange-rate
arrangement can last forever, but only that the dynamics of its crisis is
different and must involve both countries.
In this paper I describe how the bilateral exchange-rate regime (which
could be qualified "cooperative" in a game-theoretical sense, but is "asym-
metric" in the adjustment to shocks) could also collapse when asymmetric
stochastic shocks are particularly strong.
In particular, the model hinges on a very simplified framework where the
interaction between the two countries is restrained to the interdependence
of the inflation rates in the fixed exchange-rate regime. Then the trigger-
crisis point will be more likely: (i) the less open the two economies, (ii) the
more impatient the monetary authorities towards inflation, (iii) the lower
(or sometimes too high) the variability of the asymmetric shock, and (iv)
the lower the exogenous benefits from limited exchange-rate flexibility in
comparison with the complementarity in the preferences of the two monetary
authorities.
An example of such a "bilateral", but not necessarily "symmetric", fixed
exchange-rate regime can be considered the ERM after 1987.
Since the EMS was created, there was an announced bilateral way of
dealing with speculative attacks on the inside currencies: both the strong
and the weak-currency authorities were committed to intervene whenever
the exchange rate were to reach one of the band margins. The system en-
hanced its cooperative nature with the Basle-Nyborg Agreement by allowing
financing facilities for the weak currencies even before the band limits were
to be reached.
Given the anti-inflationary bias of the Bundesbank, the actual commit-
ment of the German monetary authorities has always been questioned.
2
s
However, this has not at all prevented the Bundesbank from lending to other
central banks in the occurrence of exchange rate crises, although mainly with
j'Eichengreen and Wyploss (1993) stress that the Bundesbank was never completely
committed to this cooperative system, fearing for domestic price stability. This was
achieved by means of a particular legal trick that held responsible the German government
in case of not honoring the international EMS treaty, but not the Bundesbank. However,
the Bundesbank is the authority in charge of printing and, in the case of the EMS treaty,
lending Deutsche Marks to other countries.
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sterilized interventions. In particular, during the 1992-93 crisis the Bundes-
bank (together with other central banks) gave financial support to the cur-
rencies under attack, but only up to a certain amount and not unlimitedly
as the F.R.Il rules prescribe.
In the present paper the financial support from the strong-currency cen-
t ral bank is endogenously determined for the cooperative case. It actually
represents the degree of commitment in terms of sharing the burden of the
limited nominal exchange-rate flexibility with the partner country.
Such a degree of commitment represents also the credibility of the exchange-
rate agreement. Once the trigger point has been reached, the strong-currency
authorities are no longer willing to support the weak currency by expand-
ing their money supply (for instance, by lending domestic currency to the
weak-currency authorities with no sterilization) and letting the domestic
price level increase. At the same time, the weak-currency authorities are no
longer available to implement a restrictive monetary policy.
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Once this is perceived in the foreign exchange market, the fixed exchange-
rate regime loses its credibility and speculative attacks can successfully take
place.
Finally, a question regarding the future of the EMU can naturally be
raised since the fixed exchange-rate regime of this paper closely resembles a
monetary union. If even a cooperative exchange-rate regime cannot handle
such asymmetric shocks, would then EMU be viable? Does the model show
that there may be situations for which the European Monetary Union could
inevitably break down notwithstanding the cooperative agreement?
On the one hand, it ought to be noticed that the model actually shows
t le relationship between two independent central banks, each one of them
with its own money supply and trying to stabilize its own domestic price
level. In contrast, in a monetary union there will be just one money by
definition and one general price level to stabilize by a central monetary
authority.' However, in case of very adverse shocks, it could happen that
ihe regional monetary authorities would start printing their own regional
money by undertaking the very high (exit) costs. In terms of the present
model the introduction of such exit costs would make the trigger exit point
much higher and, therefore, much less likely to occur.On the other hand, in the present setup fiscal policy is absent and it is a
6N the model this would bring undesired deflation, but it could be interpreted as a
more realistic recessionary policy in the case of presence of nominal rigidities.
2
'Actuwally De Crauwe (1994b) argues that if the European Central Bank had been
already established and operating during the period of the crisis as a super-central bank,
probably there would have been no tensions on the exchange rates.
hope that a well-designed transfer system should be able to help cope with
strong asymmetric shocks in the area.
However, besides the breakdown of the already established monetary
union, it seems more important to consider the design of the transition
towards EMU. Recently the European Commission has confirmed the grad-
ualist approach towards EMU by allowing for a period of "irrevocably fixed"
exchange rates between national currencies before switching towards a com-
mon legal tender. This means that the temptation of devaluing will have a
much lower cost than in the case of an established common currency where
a regional authority must start printing its own money from zero. In the
transition period the regional money is already there.
Then, this paper warns that even in the best type of cooperation - i.e.,
cooperation with welfare transfers of Sect. 4.1 - asymmetric shocks can
still disrupt the fixed exchange-rate regime.
However, the present model also indicates that the best way of imple-
menting such a gradualist approach is by making a credible and irreversible
change in the welfare function: the regional monetary policymaking should
credibly be committed to an objective (for instance, price stability) for the
whole monetary area.
In other words, a period of "irrevocably fixed" fixed exchange rates would
fail to lead to tensions and speculative attacks only if there will be a central
monetary authority already operating with a declared different objective
from price stability in every region and full power over the regional monetary
authorities. Only such an institution would internalize major asymmetric
shocks.
Appendix
A A Formal Derivation of the Welfare Fuiction
The objective of this Appendix is the derivation of the welfare as a function
of the current state e and of a general switching state in the cooperative
case with welfare transfers.
After obtaining the efficient burden share #;*, the value function for a
generic exit point f represents the joint welfare function of the two countries.
Such welfare function must satisfy the differential equation 7 when the
current state e is not close to the exit point:
V(e) = (1 - *dt)E[V(e(gde)] + f:(e)dt
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Since E[V(e + d)] = V(e) + E[dV], the above differential equation can
he rewritten as follows: Hence,
6V(E) = E[dV] + f;(e)dt (11)
This is an arbitrage condition that the welfare function must satisfy.
Tfhe right hand-side represents the expected return when staying in the
fixed exchange-rate agreement at time t - obtaining the flow f (e) - and
leaving at time t + dt -- collecting the expected capital gain (or loss) E[dV].
The left hand-side is the "normal " return between I and t + dt according
to the 'discount rate of the monetary authorities.
The expected change in the welfare function represents the expected
change in the differential of a function that depends uniquely on a brownian
umotion process. Hence, the simpler form of Ito's lemma can be applied:
E[dV = V"(e)dt (12)
where V"(E) stands for the second derivative of V(e) with respect to e.
Then, substituting (12) into (11) I obtain the time-autonomous second-
order differential equation of the text, which takes the following form when
substituting also for f:'(e):
o (-) = a2V"(e) + 2Z - 1 a 6~2)
The welfare function is given by the solution of this differential equation.
In particular. the overall solution is given by the sum of the general solution
and a particular solution.
The general solution is:
VG(e) = C e~
6 c + C2e
t*
where N = ,/2/o and the constants C1 and C2 have to be determined.
As a particular solution, by trying the following general functional form
VP(e) = MO + Mie,
and applying the method of undetermined coefficients to pin down the
.i's constants, I obtain the following:
22 _ aoW12  f 26 (1+ a)2 2 -(1+a)62
2Z a 2  a 2
V )=VG( P(E) = Cle~ * + C2eec + 2-- 2 - a e6 (1+a)72 62 (1+ a)61
2
The two constants can now be determined by assuming two boundary
conditions.
First, it ought to be noticed that the component 2-_ _
is the welfare function under fixed exchange rates and ignoring any possible
switch towards the flexible exchange-rate regime (see Dixit, 1993, p. 22-5).
In other words, this is the welfare function under irrevocably fixed exchange
rates or a monetary union with infinite exit costs. Then, whene - -oo
and no expectations of leaving the regime arise, the welfare function has to
tend to that component:
. _2Z - ae2  a 2
,Elu" Wio ) =6 (1+ a) 2 62 (1+ a) g2
This condition implies that Ci = 0.
Second, a value-matching condition has to hold at the general switching
state f: the value of the welfare function in fixed exchange rates at the
switching state has to equal the value of the welfare function under flexible
exchange rates, which is always zero:
lim V(e) = 0
This implies that
C=_(2Z - 00 - ae2 a -e2
2 (1+a)r1262 (1+xa)5112
and the welfare function (8) is then obtained.
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Figure 2: The Welfare Functions at Time 0.
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Figure 4: The Cooperative Exit Trigger Point and the Discount Rate, 6




Figure 6: Thle Cooperative Exit Trigger Point, the Exogenous Benefits (Z)
andl lelative inflation Aversion (a)
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